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Abstract. We use a method recently introduced by Simone and Sˇkoric´
to study accusation probabilities for non-binary Tardos fingerprinting
codes. We generalize the pre-computation steps in this approach to in-
clude a broad class of collusion attack strategies. We analytically derive
properties of a special attack that asymptotically maximizes false ac-
cusation probabilities. We present numerical results on sufficient code
lengths for this attack, and explain the abrupt transitions that occur in
these results.
1 Introduction
1.1 Collusion attacks against forensic watermarking.
Watermarking provides a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital
data. Before distribution of digital content, the content is modified by applying
an imperceptible watermark (WM), embedded using a watermarking algorithm.
Once an unauthorized copy of the content is found, it is possible to trace those
users who participated in its creation. This process is known as ‘forensic water-
marking’. Reliable tracing requires resilience against attacks that aim to remove
the WM. Collusion attacks, where a group of pirates cooperate, are a partic-
ular threat: differences between their versions of the content tell them where
the WM is located. Coding theory has produced a number of collusion-resistant
codes. The resulting system has two layers [5,9]: The coding layer determines
which message to embed and protects against collusion attacks. The underlying
watermarking layer hides symbols of the code in segments of the content. The
interface between the layers is usually specified in terms of the Marking Assump-
tion plus additional assumptions that are referred to as a ‘model’. The Marking
Assumption states that the colluders are able to perform modifications only in
those segments where they received different WMs. These segments are called
detectable positions. The ‘model’ specifies the kind of symbol manipulations that
the attackers are able to perform in detectable positions. In the Restricted Digit
Model (RDM) the attackers must choose one of the symbols that they have re-
ceived. The unreadable digit model also allows for erasures. In the arbitrary digit
model the attackers can choose arbitrary symbols, while the general digit model
additionally allows erasures.
1.2 Tardos codes.
Many collusion resistant codes have been proposed in the literature. Most notable
are the Boneh-Shaw construction [3] and the by now famous Tardos code [12].
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The former uses a concatenation of an inner code with a random outer code, while
the latter one is a fully randomized binary code. In Tardos’ original paper [12] a
binary code was given achieving length m = 100c20dln 1ε1 e, along with a proof that
m ∝ c20 is asympotically optimal for large coalitions, for all alphabet sizes. Here
c0 denotes the number of colluders to be resisted, and ε1 is the maximum allowed
probability of accusing a fixed innocent user. Tardos’ original construction had
two unfortunate design choices which caused the high proportionality constant
100. (i) The false negative probability ε2 (not accusing any attacker) was set
as ε2 = ε
c0/4
1 , even though ε2  ε1 is highly unusual in the context of content
distribution; a deterring effect is achieved already at ε2 ≈ 12 , while ε1 needs to be
very small. In the subsequent literature (e.g. [15,2]) the ε2 was decoupled from
ε1, substantially reducing m. (ii) The symbols 0 and 1 were not treated equally.
Only segments where the attackers produce a 1 were taken into account. This
ignores 50% of all information. A fully symbol-symmetric version of the scheme
was given in [13], leading to a further improvement of m by a factor 4. A further
improvement was achieved in [8]. The code construction contains a step where a
bias parameter is randomly set for each segment. In Tardos’ original construction
the probability density function (pdf) for the bias is a continuous function. In
[8] a class of discrete distributions was given that performs better than the
original pdf against finite coalition sizes. In [16,14] the Marking Assumption
was relaxed, and the accusation algorithm of the nonbinary Tardos code was
modified to effectively cope with signal processing attacks such as averaging and
addition of noise.
All the above mentioned work followed the so-called ‘simple decoder’ approach,
i.e. an accusation score is computed for each user, and if it exceeds a certain
threshold, he is considered suspicious. One can also use a ‘joint decoder’ which
computes scores for sets of users. Amiri and Tardos [1] have given a capacity-
achieving joint decoder construction for the binary code. (Capacity refers to the
information-theoretic treatment [11,7,6] of the attack as a channel.) However, the
construction is rather impractical, requiring computations for many candidate
coalitions. In [13] the binary construction was generalized to q-ary alphabets, in
the simple decoder approach. In the RDM, the transition to a larger alphabet
size has benefits beyond the mere fact that a q-ary symbol carries log2 q bits of
information.
1.3 The Gaussian approximation.
The Gaussian approximation, introduced in [15], is a useful tool in the analysis
of Tardos codes. The assumption is that the accusations are normal-distributed.
The analysis is then drastically simplified; in the RDM the scheme’s performance
is almost completely determined by a single parameter, the average accusation
µ˜ of the coalition (per segment). The sufficient code length against a coalition
of size c is m = (2/µ˜2)c2 ln(1/ε1). The Gaussian assumption is motivated by the
Central Limit Theorem (CLT): An accusation score consists of a sum of i.i.d.
per-segment contributions. When many of these get added, the result is close to
normal-distributed: the pdf is close to Gaussian in a region around the average,
and deviates from Gaussian in the tails. The larger m is, the wider this central
region. In [15,13] it was argued that in many practical cases the central region is
sufficiently wide to allow for application of the Gaussian approximation. In [10]
a semi-analytical method was developed for determining the exact shape of the
pdf of innocent users’ accusations, without simulations. This is especially useful
in the case of very low accusation probabilities, where simulations would be very
time-consuming. The false accusation probabilities were studied for two attacks:
majority voting and interleaving.
1.4 Contributions.
We discuss the simple decoder in the RDM, choosing ε2 ≈ 12 . We follow the
approach of [10] for computing false accusation probabilities. Our contribution
is threefold:
1. We prove a number of theorems (Theorems 1–3) that allow efficient compu-
tation of pdfs for more general attacks than the ones treated in [10].
2. We identify which attack minimizes the all-important1 parameter µ˜. It was
shown in [10] that the majority voting attack achieves this for certain parameter
settings, but we consider more general parameter values. We derive some basic
properties of the attack.
3. We present numerical results for the µ˜-minimizing attack. When the coalition
is small the graphs contain sharp transitions; we explain these transitions as an
effect of the abrupt changes in pdf shape when the attack turns from majority
voting into minority voting.
2 Notation and preliminaries
We briefly describe the q-ary version of the Tardos code as introduced in [13]
and the method of [10] to compute innocent accusation probabilities.
2.1 The q-ary Tardos code.
The number of symbols in a codeword is m. The number of users is n. The
alphabet is Q, with size q. Xji ∈ Q stands for the i’th symbol in the codeword
of user j. The whole matrix of codewords is denoted as X.
Two-step code generation. m vectors p(i) ∈ [0, 1]q are independently drawn ac-
cording to a distribution F , with
F (p) = δ(1−
∑
β∈Q
pβ) · 1
B(κ1q)
∏
α∈Q
p−1+κα . (1)
Here 1q stands for the vector (1, · · · , 1) of length q, δ(·) is the Dirac delta
function, and B is the generalized Beta function. κ is a positive constant. For
v1, · · · , vn > 0 the Beta function is defined as2
B(v) =
∫ 1
0
dxn δ(1−
n∑
a=1
xa)
n∏
b=1
x−1+vbb =
∏n
a=1 Γ (va)
Γ (
∑n
b=1 vb)
. (2)
1 Asymptotically for large m, the µ˜-minimizing attack is the ‘worst case’ attack in
the RDM in the sense that the false accusation probability is maximized.
2 This is also known as a Dirichlet integral. The ordinary Beta function (n = 2) is
B(x, y) = Γ (x)Γ (y)/Γ (x+ y).
All elements Xji are drawn independently according to Pr[Xji = α|p(i)] = p(i)α .
Attack. The coalition is C, with size c. The i’th segment of the pirated content
contains a symbol yi ∈ Q. We define vectors σ(i) ∈ Nq as
σ(i)α , |{j ∈ C : Xji = α}| (3)
satisfying
∑
α∈Q σ
(i)
α = c. In words: σ
(i)
α counts how many colluders have received
symbol α in segment i. The attack strategy may be probabilistic. As usual,
it is assumed that this strategy is column-symmetric, symbol-symmetric and
attacker-symmetric. It is expressed as probabilities θy|σ that apply independently
for each segment. Omitting the column index,
Pr[y|σ] = θy|σ. (4)
Accusation. The watermark detector sees the symbols yi. For each user j, the
accusation sum Sj is computed,
Sj =
m∑
i=1
S
(i)
j where S
(i)
j = g[Xji==yi](p
(i)
yi ), (5)
where the expression [Xji == yi] evaluates to 1 if Xji = yi and to 0 otherwise,
and the functions g0 and g1 are defined as
g1(p) ,
√
1− p
p
; g0(p) , −
√
p
1− p . (6)
The total accusation of the coalition is S :=
∑
j∈C Sj . The choice (6) is the
unique choice that satisfies
pg1(p) + (1− p)g0(p) = 0 ; p[g1(p)]2 + (1− p)[g0(p)]2 = 1. (7)
This has been shown to have optimal properties for q = 2 [4,15]. Its unique
properties (7) also hold for q ≥ 3; that is the main motivation for using (6). A
user is ‘accused’ if his accusation sum exceeds a threshold Z, i.e. Sj > Z.
The parameter µ˜ is defined as 1mE[S], where E stands for the expectation value
over all random variables. The µ˜ depends on q, κ, the collusion strategy, and
weakly on c. In the limit of large c it converges to a finite value, and the code
length scales as c2/µ˜2.
2.2 Marginal distributions and strategy parametrization.
Because of the independence between segments, the segment index will be dropped
from this point onward. For given p, the vector σ is multinomial-distributed,
P(σ|p) = (cσ)∏α pσαα . Averaged over p, the σ has distribution P(σ) = (cσ)B(κ1q+σ)B(κ1q) .
Two important marginals were given in [10]. First, the marginal probability
P1(b) , Pr[σα = b] for one arbitrary component α,
P1(b) =
(
c
b
)
B(κ+ b, κ[q − 1] + c− b)
B(κ, κ[q − 1]) . (8)
Second, given that σα = b, the probability that the remaining q− 1 components
of the vector σ are given by x,
Pq−1(x|b) =
(
c− b
x
)
B(κ1q−1 + x)
B(κ1q−1)
. (9)
It is always implicit that
∑
β∈Q\{α} xβ = c− b.
An alternative parametrization was introduced for the collusion strategy, which
exploits the fact that (i) θα|σ is invariant under permutation of the symbols 6= α;
(ii) θα|σ depends on α only through the value of σα.
Ψb(x) , θα|σ given that σα = b and x = the other components of σ. (10)
Thus, Ψb(x) is the probability that the pirates choose a symbol that they have
seen b times, given that the other symbols’ occurences are x. Strategy-dependent
parameters Kb were introduced as follows,
Kb , Ex|bΨb(x) =
∑
x
Pq−1(x|b)Ψb(x). (11)
Due to the marking assumption K0 = 0 and Kc = 1. The Kb obey the sum rule
q
∑c
b=0KbP1(b) = 1. Efficient pre-computation of the Kb parameters can speed
up the computation of a number of quantities of interest, among which the µ˜
parameter. It was shown that µ˜ can be expressed as
µ˜ =
∑
σ
P(σ)
∑
α∈Q
θα|σT (σα) = q
c∑
b=0
KbP1(b)T (b), (12)
where
T (b) ,
{
1
2 − κ+
b
c
(κq − 1)
}
c
Γ (b+ κ− 12 )
Γ (b+ κ)
Γ (c− b+ κ[q − 1]− 12 )
Γ (c− b+ κ[q − 1]) . (13)
2.3 Method for computing false accusation probabilities.
The method of [10] is based on the convolution rule for generating functions
(Fourier transforms): Let A1 ∼ f1 and A2 ∼ f2 be continuous random variables,
and let f˜1, f˜2 be the Fourier transforms of the respective pdfs. Let A = A1 +A2.
Then the easiest way to compute the pdf of A (say Φ) is to use the fact that
Φ˜(k) = f˜1(k)f˜2(k). If m i.i.d. variables Ai ∼ ϕ are added, A =
∑
iAi, then the
pdf of A is found using Φ˜(k) = [ϕ˜(k)]m. In [10] the pdf ϕ was derived for an
innocent user’s one-segment accusation S
(i)
j . The Fourier transform was found
to be
ϕ˜(k) =
2q
B(κ, κ[q − 1])
c∑
b=1
(
c
b
)
Kb ·
[
Λ(db, vb; k) + Λ(vb − 1, db + 1;−k)
]
, (14)
with
db , b+ κ ; vb , c− b+ κ[q − 1] + 1
Λ(d, v; k) = (−ik)2vΓ (−2v) 1F2(v+d; v+ 12 , v+1;
k2
4
)+ 12
∞∑
j=0
(ik)j
j!
B(d+
j
2
, v− j
2
).
Using this result for ϕ˜ it is then possible to cast the expression ϕ˜m in the following
special form, [
ϕ˜(
k√
m
)
]m
= e−
1
2k
2
[
1 +
∞∑
t=0
ωt(m)(i sgn k)
αt |k|νt
]
, (15)
where αt are real numbers; the coefficients ωt(m) are real; the powers νt satisfy
ν0 > 2, νt+1 > νt. In general the νt are not all integer. The ωt decrease with in-
creasing m as m−νt/6 or faster. Computing all the αt, ωt, νt up to a certain cutoff
t = tmax is straightforward but laborious, and leads to huge expressions if done
analytically; it is best done numerically, e.g. using series operations in Mathe-
matica. Once all these coefficients are known, the false accusation probability is
computed as follows. Let Rm be a function defined as Rm(Z˜) := Pr[Sj > Z˜
√
m]
(for innocent j). Let Ω be the corresponding function in case the pdf of Sj is
Gaussian, Ω(Z˜) = 12Erfc(Z˜/
√
2). Then
Rm(Z˜) = Ω(Z˜) +
1
pi
∞∑
t=0
ωt(m)Γ (νt)2
νt/2Im
[
i−αtH−νt(iZ˜/
√
2)
]
. (16)
Here H is the Hermite function. It holds that limm→∞Rm(Z˜) = Ω(Z˜). For a
good numerical approximation it suffices to take terms up to some cutoff tmax.
The required tmax is a decreasing function of m.
3 Our results
3.1 Computing Kb for several classes of colluder strategy.
Our first contribution is a prescription for efficiently computing the Kb parame-
ters for more general colluder strategies than those studied in [10]. We consider
the strategy parametrization Ψb(x) with b 6= 0. The vector x ∈ Nq−1 can contain
several entries equal to b. The number of such entries will be denoted as `. (The
dependence of ` on b and x is suppressed in the notation for the sake of brevity.)
The number of remaining entries is r , q − 1− `. These entries will be denoted
as z = (z1, · · · , zr), with zj 6= b by definition. Any strategy possessing the sym-
metries mentioned in Section 2 can be parametrized as a function Ψb(x) which
in turn can be expressed as a function of b, ` and z; it is invariant under per-
mutation of the entries in z. We will concentrate on the following ‘factorizable’
classes of attack, each one a sub-class of the previous one.
Class 1: Ψb(x) is of the form w(b, `)
∏r
k=1W (b, `, zk)
Class 2: Ψb(x) is of the form
w(b)
`+1
∏r
k=1W (b, zk)
Class 3: Ψb(x) is of the form
1
`+1
∏r
k=1W (b, zk), with W (b, zk) ∈ {0, 1} and
W (b, zk) +W (zk, b) = 1. By definition W (b, 0) = 1.
Class 1 merely restricts the dependence on z to a form factorizable in the com-
ponents zk. This is a very broad class, and contains e.g. the interleaving attack
(θα|σ = σαc , Ψb(x) =
b
c ) which has no dependence on z.
Class 2 puts a further restriction on the `-dependence. The factor 1/(`+1) implies
that symbols with equal occurrence have equal probability of being selected by
the colluders. (There are `+ 1 symbols that occur b times.)
Class 3 restricts the function W to a binary ‘comparison’ of its two arguments:
Ψb(x) is nonzero only if b is ‘better’ than zk for all k, i.e. W (b, zk) = 1. An
example of such a strategy is majority voting, where Ψb(x) = 0 if there exists a
k such that zk > b, and Ψb(x) =
1
`+1 if zk < b for all k. Class 3 also contains
minority voting, and in fact any strategy which uses a strict ordering or ‘ranking’
of the occurrence counters b, zk. (Here a zero always counts as ‘worse’ than
nonzero.)
Our motivation for introducing classes 1 and 2 is mainly technical, since they
affect to which extent the Kb parameters can be computed analytically. In the
next section we will see that class 3 captures not only majority/minority voting
but also the µ˜-reducing attack.
Theorem 1. Let Nb ∈ N satisfy Nb > max{c − b, |c − bq|, (c − b)(q − 2)}. Let
τb , ei2pi/Nb , and let
Gba` ,
∑
z∈{0,...,c−b}\{b}
Γ (κ+ z)W (b, `, z)
τazb z!
, vba ,
Γ (κ+ b)
τabb b!
. (17)
Then for strategies in class 1 it holds that
Kb =
(c− b)!
NbΓ (c− b+ κ[q − 1])B(κ1q−1)
Nb−1∑
a=0
τ
a(c−b)
b
q−1∑
`=0
(
q − 1
`
)
Gq−1−`ba` w(b, `)v
`
ba.
Theorem 2. For strategies in class 2 the quantity Gba` as defined in (17) does
not depend on ` and can be denoted as Gba (with W (b, `, z) replaced by W (b, z)).
It then holds that
Kb =
b!(c− b)! w(b)
qNbΓ (κ+ b)Γ (c− b+ κ[q − 1])B(κ1q−1)
Nb−1∑
a=0
τacb [(Gba + vba)
q −Gqba] .
Theorem 3. For strategies in class 3, Theorem 2 holds, where w(b) = 1 and
Gba can be expressed as
Gba =
∑
z∈{0,...,c−b}\{b}
W (b,z)=1
Γ (κ+ z)
τazb z!
. (18)
The proofs of Theorems 1–3 are given in the Appendix. Without these theorems,
straightforward computation of Kb following (11) would require a full sum over
x, which for large c comprises O(cq−2/(q − 1)!) different terms. (q − 1 variables
≤ c − b, with one constraint, and with permutation symmetry. We neglect the
dependence on b.) Theorem 1 reduces the number of terms to O(q2c2) at worst;
a factor c from computing Gba, a factor q from
∑
` and a factor Nb from
∑
a,
with Nb < qc. In Theorem 2 the `-sum is eliminated, resulting in O(qc2) terms.
We conclude that, for q ≥ 5 and large c, Theorems 1 and 2 can significantly
reduce the time required to compute the Kb parameters.
3 A further reduction
occurs in Class 3 if the W (b, z) function is zero for many z.
3.2 The µ˜-minimizing attack.
Asymptotically for large code lengths the colluder strategy has negligible impact
on the Gaussian shape of the innocent (and guilty) accusation pdf. For q ≥ 3
the main impact of their strategy is on the value of the statistical parameter µ˜.
(For the binary symmetric scheme with κ = 12 , the µ˜ is fixed at
2
pi ; the attackers
cannot change it. Then the strategy’s impact on the pdf shape is not negligible.)
Hence for q ≥ 3 the strategy that minimizes µ˜ is asymptotically a ‘worst-case’
attack in the sense of maximizing the false positive probability. This was already
argued in [13], and it was shown how the attackers can minimize µ˜. From the
first expression in (12) it is evident that, for a given σ, the attackers must choose
the symbol y such that T (σy) is minimal, i.e. y = arg minα T (σα). In case of a
tie it does not matter which of the best symbols is chosen, and without loss
of generality we impose symbol symmetry, i.e. if the minimum T (σα) is shared
by N different symbols, then each of these symbols will have probability 1/N
of being elected. Note that this strategy fits in class 3. The function W (b, zk)
evaluates to 1 if T (b) < T (zk) and to 0 otherwise.
4
Let us introduce the notation x = b/c, x ∈ (0, 1). Then for large c we have [10]
T (cx) ≈
1
2 − κ+ x(κq − 1)√
x(1− x) . (19)
From (19) we deduce some elementary properties of the function T .
– If κ < 12(q−1) then T is monotonically decreasing, and T (b) may become
negative at large b.
– If κ > 12 , then T is monotonically increasing, and T (b) may become negative
at small b.
– For κ in between those values, T (b) is nonnegative and has a minimum at
b
c ≈ 1q−2 ( 12κ − 1).
We expect that the existence of negative T (b) values has a very bad impact on
µ˜, and hence that κ is best chosen in the interval ( 12(q−1) ,
1
2 ).
Fig. 1 shows the function T (b) for two values of κ outside this ‘safe’ interval. For
κ = 0.2 it is indeed the case that T (b) < 0 at large b, and for κ = 0.9 at small b.
3 To get some feeling for the orders of magnitude: The crossover point where qc2 =
cq−2/(q − 1)! lies at c = 120, 27, 18, 15, 13, for q =5, 6, 7, 8, 9 respectively.
4 For x, y ∈ N, with x 6= y, it does not occur in general that T (x) = T (y). The only
way to make this happen is to choose κ in a very special way as a function of q and c.
W.l.o.g. we assume that κ is not such a pathological case.
T(b)
q ! 3
c ! 20
Κ ! 0.2
b/c
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
#0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
q ! 3
c ! 20
Κ ! 0.9
T(b)
b/c
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
#1
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 1. The function T (b) for q = 3, c = 20 and two values κ outside ( 12[q−1] ,
1
2 ).
Note that T (c) is always positive due to the Marking Assumption. For small κ,
the T (b)-ranking of the points is clearly such that majority voting is the best
strategy; similarly, for large κ minority voting is best. For intermediate values
of κ a more complicated ranking will occur.
3.3 Numerical results for the µ˜-minimizing attack.
In [10] the µ˜-minimizing attack was studied for a restricted parameter range,
κ ≈ 1/q. For such a choice of κ the strategy reduces to majority voting. We study
a broader range, applying the full µ˜-minimizing attack. We use Theorem 3 to
precompute the Kb and then (14), (15) and (16) to compute the false accusation
probability Rm as a function of the accusation threshold. We found that keeping
terms in the expansion with νt ≤ 37 gave stable results.
For a comparison with [10], we set ε1 = 10
−10, and search for the smallest
codelength m∗ for which it holds that Rm(µ˜
√
m/c) ≤ ε1. The special choice Z˜ =
µ˜
√
m/c puts the threshold at the expectation value of a colluder’s accusation.
As a result the probability of a false negative error is ≈ 12 . Our results for m∗
are consistent with the numbers given in [10].
In Fig. 2 we present graphs of 2/µ˜2 as a function of κ for various q, c. 5 If
the accusation pdf is Gaussian, then the quantity 2/µ˜2 is very close to the
proportionality constant in the equation m ∝ c2 ln(1/ε1). We also plot m∗c2 ln(1/ε1)
as a function of κ for various q, c. Any discrepancy between the µ˜ and m∗ plots
is caused by non-Gaussian tail shapes.
In the plots on the left we see that the attack becomes very powerful (very large
2/µ˜2) around κ = 12 , especially for large coalitions. This can be understood from
the fact that the T (b) values are decreasing, and some even becoming negative for
κ > 12 , as discussed in Section 3.2. This effect becomes weaker when q increases.
The plots also show a strong deterioration of the scheme’s performance when κ
approaches 12(q−1) , as expected.
5 The µ˜ can become negative. These points are not plotted, as they represent a
situation where the accusation scheme totally fails, and there exists no sufficient
code length m∗.)
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Fig. 2. Numerical results for the µ˜-minimizing attack. ε1 = 10
−10. Left: The
Gaussian-limit code length constant 2µ˜2 as a function of κ, for various q and c.
Right: The sufficient code length m∗, scaled by the factor c2 ln(1/ε1) for easy
comparison to the Gaussian limit.
For small and large κ, the left and right graphs show roughly the same be-
haviour. In the middle of the κ-range, however, the m∗ is very irregular. We
think that this is caused by rapid changes in the ‘ranking’ of b values induced
by the function T (b); there is a transition from majority voting (at small κ) to
minority voting (at large κ). It was shown in [10] that (i) majority voting causes
a more Gaussian tail shape than minority voting; (ii) increasing κ makes the
tail more Gaussian. These two effects together explain the m∗ graphs in Fig. 2:
first, the transition for majority voting to minority voting makes the tail less
Gaussian (hence increasing m∗), and then increasing κ gradually makes the tail
more Gaussian again (reducing m∗).
In Fig. 3 we show the shape of the false accusation pdf of both sides of the
transition in the q = 3, c = 7 plot. For the smaller κ the curve is better than
Gaussian up to false accusation probabilities of better than 10−17. For the larger
κ the curve becomes worse than Gaussian around 10−8, which lies significantly
above the desired 10−10.
The transition from majority to minority voting is cleanest for q = 2, and was
already shown in [13] to lie precisely at κ = 12 for all c. For q ≥ 3 it depends on
c and is less easy to pinpoint.
Log10 prob.
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c ! 7
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Κ ! 0.335
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Fig. 3. Accusation probability for a fixed innocent user as a function of the
(scaled) accusation threshold Z˜ = Z/
√
m. The attack is the µ˜-minimizing at-
tack. The graph shows the Gaussian limit, and two parameter settings which
correspond to ‘before’ and ‘after’ a sharp transition.
4 Discussion
We have tested the pdf computation method of [10] for a large range of parameter
values and for the various ‘rankings’ that are part of the µ˜-minimizing attack.
The method has performed well under all these conditions.
Our results reveal the subtle interplay between the average colluder accusation
µ˜ and the shape of the pdf of an innocent user’s accusation sum. The sharp
transitions that occur in Fig. 2 show that there is a κ-range (to the left of the
transition) where the µ˜-reducing attack is not optimal for small coalitions. It is
not yet clear what the optimal attack would be there, but certainly it has to be
an attack that concentrates more on the pdf shape than on µ˜, e.g. the minority
voting or the interleaving attack.
For large coalitions the pdfs are very close to Gaussian. From the optimum points
m∗ as a function of κ we see that it can be advantageous to use an alphabet
size q > 2. (Even if a non-binary symbol occupies log2 q times more space in the
content than a binary symbol.)
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
We start from (11), with Pq−1 defined in (9), and reorganize the x-sum to take
the multiplicity ` into account:
∑
x
[· · · ]→
`max∑
`=0
(
q − 1
`
) ∑
z∈({0,...,c−b}\{b})r
δ0,c−b(`+1)−∑rk=1 zk [· · · ]
=
`max∑
`=0
(
q − 1
`
) ∑
z1∈{0,...,c−b}\{b}
· · ·
∑
zr∈{0,...,c−b}\{b}
δ0,c−b(`+1)−∑rk=1 zk [· · · ]
where δ is the Kronecker delta, and `max = min{q − 1, b c−bb c}. The factor
(
q−1
`
)
pops up because the summand in (11) is fully symmetric under permutations
of x. The Kronecker delta takes care of the constraint that the components of z
add up to c− b− `b.
If `max = b c−bb c and the sum over ` is extended beyond `max, then all the addi-
tional terms are zero, because the Kronecker delta condition cannot be satisfied.
(The
∑
k zk would have to become negative.) Hence we are free to replace the
upper summation bound `max by q − 1 without changing the result of the sum.
Next we use a sum representation of the Kronecker δ as follows,
δ0,s =
1
Nb
Nb−1∑
a=0
(ei2pi/Nb)as, (20)
with s = c− b(l+ 1)−∑k zk. This is a correct representation only if Nb is larger
than the maximum |s| that can occur. The most positive possible value of s is
attained at (` = 0, z = 0), namely s = c− b. The most negative value (sneg) is
attained when zk = c− b for all k. Since there are r = q − 1− ` components in
z, we have sneg = min`[c − b(` + 1) − (q − 1 − `)(c − b)]. The function is linear
in `, so there are only two candidates: the extreme values ` = 0 and ` = q − 1,
which yield |sneg| = (q − 2)(c − b) and |sneg| = |c − bq| respectively. Hence Nb
has to be larger than max{c− b, (q − 2)(c− b), |c− bq|}.
Our expression for Kb now contains sums over `, zk and a. We shift the a-sum
completely to the left. Next we write
B(κ1q−1 + x) =
[Γ (κ+ b)]`
∏q−1−`
k=1 Γ (κ+ zk)
Γ (c− b+ κ[q − 1]) , (21)(
c− b
x
)
=
(c− b)!
[b!]`
∏q−1−`
k=1 zk!
. (22)
All the expressions depending on the zk variables are fully factorized; the part
of the summand that contains the zk is given by
q−1−`∏
k=1
 ∑
zk∈{0,...,c−b}\{b}
W (b, `, zk)Γ (κ+ zk)
zk! τ
azk
b
 = (Gba`)q−1−`. (23)
Theorem 1 follows after some elementary rewriting. 
Proof of Theorem 2
We start from Kb as given by Theorem 1. The Gba` becomes Gba, so the factor
Gq−1ba can be moved out of the `-sum. The w(b, `) becomes w(b)/(`+1) and w(b)
can also be moved out of the `-sum. The remaining sum is
∑q−1
`=0
(
q−1
`
)
1
`+1 (vba/Gba)
`
which evaluates to [(Gba+vba)
q−Gqba]G1−qba /(qvba). Theorem 2 follows after sub-
stituting the definition of vba and some rewriting. 
Proof of Theorem 3
In (17) the W (b, `, z) becomes W (b, z). The definition of class 3 specifies that
W (b, z) is either 1 or 0. The result (18) trivially follows. 
